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I.  Introduction 
Since the horrible events of September 11, 2001, many deeply 
convicted and well-meaning Christians have been misled to fear that there 
is a war on religion being waged by other Americans, and even by our 
President, in addition to the war being waged against our nation by actual 
terrorists.1  Acting out of this fear and the belief that the “Great 
Commission” requires Christians to spread the word of God,2 some 
evangelical and fundamentalist Christians have begun injecting Christianity 
into government in unconstitutional ways.  These “organized act[s] of civil 
disobedience” are, consistent with their religious ideology, abundantly 
righteous in their view.3 
To physically memorialize their victories and to reach youth and future 
generations in this perceived war in ways thus far prohibited by the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, modern religious 
ideologues seek to call into question the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence en masse.  As one 2005 article noted of the 
movement’s origins: 
Notwithstanding Supreme Court rulings suggesting that religious 
symbols standing alone on government property are unconstitutional, a 
number of organizations, the most well-known of which are the Family 
Research Council and Focus on the Family, have mobilized support for 
defending Ten Commandments displays on government property. 
                                                                                                     
 1. E.g., Barbara B. Hagerty, Has Obama Waged a War on Religion?, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/08/144835720/has-obama-waged-a-war-
on-religion.   
 2.  Matthew 28:16–20 (International Version) (“[Go] and make disciples of all 
nations… teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you.”).  This religious 
requirement is known as “the Great Commission.”  See The Great Commission, WIKIPEDIA: 
THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, (Last updated June 7, 2013), http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Commission. 
 3. Adam Cohen, Pulpit Freedom: Should Churches Endorse Political Candidates?, 
TIME (Oct. 16, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/10/16/should-churches-endorse-political-
candidates/ (reporting “Pulpit Freedom Sunday” to endorse Mitt Romney in churches across 
America, contrary to the provisions of the U.S. Tax Code that apply to these typically “non-
profit” entities).  It seems possible that the recent IRS scandal surrounding investigation of 
political activity is related to this wave of civil disobedience.  See e.g., Jonathan Weisman, 
I.R.S. Chief Out after Protest Over Scrutiny of Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at 1.  But 
see, e.g., Patrick Temple-West, Insight: IRS Has Long History of Burying Non-profits in 
Paperwork, REUTERS.COM (June 3, 2013 3:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/06/03/us-usa-irs-applications-insight-idUSBRE95210L20130603 (“While 
conservative groups are currently grabbing headlines, a range of charitable non-profits [such 
as an atheist summer camp 501(c)(3)] say they too were unfairly targeted.”). 
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Lawmakers in Kentucky and Indiana have made a concerted effort to 
post Ten Commandments in schools.  Indeed, Justice Roy Moore built 
his career on posting the Ten Commandments in courthouses—a career 
that even contemplated a third-party run for the presidency.4 
Roy Moore was recently re-elected as the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Alabama,5 but prior to taking the office for a second time, he was 
ousted from the bench after refusing to comply with a federal order to 
remove a massive Decalogue he installed in the courthouse, which also 
resulted in a legal fight costing Alabama taxpayers over $550,000.6  He 
became the President—and remains President Emeritus—of the Foundation 
of Moral Law.7  The three-fold mission of the foundation was stated openly 
in 2004: “(1) defend the ‘right to acknowledge Almighty God’ (including 
the defense of Roy Moore); (2) ‘educate the public about the U.S. 
Constitution and the Godly foundation of the United States of America; and 
(3) ‘reestablish society with good morals and values as set forth in the Holy 
Bible.’”8  It remains largely the same today.9 
The legal strategy of right-leaning evangelicals and fundamentalists 
seems to be to outnumber and outlast their opponents.  Presumably, those 
improperly using government to perpetuate religiosity hope they will buy 
time to persevere over those few with the litigation budget, time, and 
endurance to challenge the religious displays in court one by one.  If those 
opposing them are forced to fight each Establishment Clause violation on a 
micro, case-by-case level, they eventually will find themselves like the 
plaintiffs in Van Orden v. Perry,10 who were faced with multitudes of 
                                                                                                     
 4. Susanna Dokupil, “Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness:” “Sham” Secular 
Purposes in Ten Commandments Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 613–14 (2005) 
[hereinafter Dokupil]. 
 5. See SUP. CT. OF ALA., http://judicial.alabama.gov/supreme.cfm (last visited May 
27, 2013). 
 6. See generally McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (ruling in one 
of the various resulting cases dealing with the courthouse Decalogue). 
 7. See FOUND. FOR MORAL LAW, http://morallaw.org/about/ (last visited May 27, 
2013). 
 8. Dokupil, supra note 4, at 614 n.15 (citing About the Foundation, Foundation for 
Moral Law, Inc., available at http://www.morallaw.org/about.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 
200)). 
 9. See FOUND. FOR MORAL LAW, supra note 7 (stating that the foundation’s focus is 
on “litigation,” which it describes as “represent[ing] individuals involved in religious 
liberties cases and fil[ing] amicus curiae (friend-of-the-court) briefs in state and federal 
courts,” and “education,” which it describes as “conduct[ing] seminars to teach the necessity 
and importance of acknowledging God in law and government”). 
 10. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the Establishment 
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monuments that the Fraternal Order of Eagles successfully maneuvered to 
have installed on government property forty years earlier.11  The sheer 
volume of the displays makes them difficult to attack on an individual 
basis.  And, over time, courts tend to value the historical nature of a long-
standing monument over its religiosity,12 further entrenching such displays 
and insulating them from constitutional challenge. 
Although it would be difficult—if not impossible—to prove 
empirically, the alienation of nonbelievers from modern American politics 
was likely fated by the enthusiastic injection of God into politics to 
distinguish America from the atheist Soviet bloc during the Cold War.13  
Litigating against the exclusion of nonbelievers and atheist messages from 
governmental religious displays unfortunately risks extending some of the 
Supreme Court’s less favorable precedent14 despite today’s significantly 
more pluralistic society.15  On the other hand, the potential consequences of 
failing to challenge governmental endorsement of religion are significant:  
the promotion of God via American politics may become increasingly 
mainstream and therefore legitimized over the long run.  Nonbelievers may 
become even more ostracized in American society, particularly in the 
heartland and other areas where religion is deeply entrenched.16  The 
balance of these risks may soon tip to one side or the other; the Supreme 
Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether the practice of the 
                                                                                                     
Clause was not violated by monument display). 
 11. Jess Bravin, When Moses’ Laws Run Afoul of the U.S.’s, Get Me Cecil B. deMille, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2001, at A1. 
 12. See infra Part I(B). 
 13. See FRANCOISE CHAOY, THE INVENTION OF THE HISTORIC MONUMENT (Lauren M. 
O’Connell, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (describing historical role monuments play 
in shaping society and history); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–26 (1996) (describing how legal documents and statements 
contribute to social norms, including faith). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See generally B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial 
Deism and Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2010); Frank Newport, This 
Christmas, 78% of Americans Identify as Christian, GALLUP (Dec. 24, 2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/124793/this-christmas-78-americans-identify-christian.aspx 
 (discussing that the 1950s were “a very religious decade, based on Gallup indicators.”). 
 16. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2005) (discussing lawyer-scholar’s evolution of thoughts about religious jurisprudence); 
Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional Rights, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 39–40 (2009) (describing violence, intimidation and 
harassment of non-Christians in Santa Fe, Texas).  But see Marc O. Girolami, Recoiling from 
Religion, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619 (2006) (critiquing Hamilton’s book). 
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Greece, New York, town board of opening its meetings with a prayer from 
the “chaplain of the month” violates the Establishment Clause.17 
To be sure, most litigation in the religious liberty arena has focused on 
the Establishment Clause.  Reviewing the complaints filed in such litigation 
shows that the cases start out by at least implicating doctrines other than the 
Establishment Clause, but in the end the Establishment Clause remains the 
focus of the litigation and the resulting judicial opinion.18  At its heart, 
however, such litigation is about discrimination between competing points 
of view and the exclusion of non-mainstream or counter-cultural groups, 
and many of the recent cases concern ostracism of nonbelievers.19 
This Article posits that for those seeking to remedy the 
unconstitutional ostracism of nonbelievers and others, future litigation 
should develop new, progressive theories.  Part I analyzes the current 
prospects of Establishment Clause litigation for nonbelievers and others 
seeking to utilize the courts to uphold the church-state divide and 
demonstrates why a new path is necessary.  Part II demonstrates that legal 
theories beyond the Establishment Clause, such as the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or Equal Protection principles 
inherent in the Fifth Amendment), and the Religious Test Clause of Article 
VI, § 3, and their state constitutional corollaries, should be explored as a 
basis for challenging the injection of religion into government today.  This 
Article concludes by calling for groups and individuals seeking to challenge 
the injection of God into American politics and civic life to brainstorm and 
share strategies, including by responding to this Article, to develop new, 
stronger legal theories to support such litigation. 
II.  Establishment Clause Litigation Prospects for Nonbelievers 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 
WL 2149803 (May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696) (finding Establishment Clause violation because 
prayer practice impermissibly endorsed a Christian viewpoint). 
 18. E.g., Second Amended Complaint at 10, Nielson v. School District Five of 
Lexington & Richland Counties, No. 3:12-cv-01427-CMC (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2012), available 
at http://ffrf.org/uploads/legal/Currie-SAC.pdf; see also infra Part I (discussing 
Establishment Clause opinions). 
 19. See Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal 
Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 665, 673 (2008). 
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”20  “The underlying purpose of the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses is to assure the fullest possible scope 
of religious liberty and tolerance for all, to avoid the religious divisiveness 
that promotes social conflict, and to maintain the separation of church and 
state.”21  The Founders maintained a heightened sensitivity to the divisive 
potential of religion in the new republic, as reflected upon by the Supreme 
Court in a landmark 1989 case, County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union of Pittsburgh: 
This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that 
dates from the settlement of the North American Continent.  Sectarian 
differences among various Christian denominations were central to the 
origins of our Republic.  Since then, adherents of religions too numerous 
to name have made the United States their home, as have those whose 
beliefs expressly exclude religion.22  
The County of Allegheny majority opinion held that a courthouse 
crèche would need to be removed, which would “deprive Christians of the 
satisfaction of seeing the government adopt their religious message as their 
own, but this kind of government affiliation with particular religious 
messages is precisely what the Establishment Clause precludes.”23  On the 
other hand, not allowing governmental affiliation with a particular religious 
viewpoint does not equate to hostility toward religion.  For example, three 
concurring Justices wrote: 
The suggestion that the only alternative to governmental support of 
religion is governmental hostility to it represents a giant step backward 
in our Religion Clause jurisprudence.  Indeed in its first contemporary 
examination of the Establishment Clause, the Court, while differing on 
how to apply the principle, unanimously agreed that government could 
not require believers or nonbelievers to support religions.24 
                                                                                                     
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 21. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 678 (2005). 
 22. Cnty. Of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 589 (1989) 
(holding that a display of a crèche violated the establishment clause and that a display of 
Menorah next to a Christmas tree did not have an unconstitutional effect of endorsing 
Christian and Jewish faiths).  For more historical discussion, see Response in Opposition to 
The United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Am. Atheists v. Werfel, No. 2:12-cv-00265 (E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 6, 2013), ECF No. 22, at 26-28, 31-32. 
 23. Id. at 601 n.51.  This Part of the Court’s opinion was authored by Justice 
Blackmun and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor. 
 24. Id. at 651 (partial concurrence and dissent of Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and 
Stevens, J.) (citations omitted). 
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It is commonly accepted that the Establishment Clause prohibits 
government from endorsing, giving favoritism, or promoting one religion 
over another.25  In light of the fact that our political history is rife with 
references to God, many dispute the Jeffersonian conception of a 
constitutional wall between church and state that should prohibit any 
governmental invocation of deistic belief.26  Even for those who reject the 
Jeffersonian view, it is hard to dispute that “[o]ne of the main goals of the 
Establishment Clause is to protect religious minorities like nonbelievers.”27  
At stake in current litigation brought by nonbelievers is the scope of the 
Establishment Clause’s protection of those who stand in opposition to 
organized religion, a group of Americans maligned in McCarthy-like 
fashion as stereotypically “un-American.”28 According to Professor 
Caroline Mala Corbin, an expert in the Establishment Clause and 
nonbelievers, “[t]he perpetuation of these stereotypes also undermines the 
liberty of nonbelievers by making them less willing, or even afraid, to 
follow the dictates of their conscience.”29 
Justice O’Connor was the most outspoken member of the Court in 
stating plainly and often that the Establishment Clause does indeed prevent 
favoritism of deistic belief over non-belief, but she was not the only one to 
adopt this position.  The following are excerpts in reverse chronological 
order from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence most relevant to this issue: 
• “Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions 
must not press religious observations upon their citizens.”  Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (plurality opinion, authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas). 
                                                                                                     
 25. E.g., Caroline M. Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious 
Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2010) [hereinafter “Corbin I”] (“However, there is 
near unanimity among courts and commentators that the Establishment Clause forbids the 
government from preferring one or some religions over others.”). 
 26. Id. at 1545; see also Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New Perspective on Jefferson’s Views 
on Church-State Relations: The Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom in its 
Legislative Context, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 172 (1991); see also, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, 
Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9 (1995). 
 27. Caroline M. Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347, 
347 (2012) (hereinafter “Corbin II”). 
 28. See infra Part II; see also, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the 
Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 380 (1992) (“By making such statements, 
the government says the real American religion is watered-down Christianity, and everybody 
else is a little bit un-American.”). 
 29. Corbin II, supra note 27, at 347. 
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• The First Amendment “guarantee[s] religious liberty and equality to 
‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of the non-Christian faith such as 
Islam or Judaism.’” Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 
U.S. 574, 590 (1989) (majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor). 
• “[G]overnment cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of 
some citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they 
are outsiders or less than full members of the political community . . .” 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
• “[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual 
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the 
right to select any religious faith or none at all.”  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell). 
• “Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in 
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile 
to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may not aid, 
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or 
even against the militant opposite.  The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion.”  Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103-
04 (1968) (majority opinion, authored by Justice Fortas, joined by Chief 
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall). 
• “The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that 
government . . . effect no favoritism among sects or between religion 
and nonreligion.” Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Justice Harlan).  
• “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion 
by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and 
State.’” Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) 
(majority opinion, authored by Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice 
Vinson and Justices Reed, Douglas, and Murphy). 
Lower federal courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence ever since the Court issued its opinion 
in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.30  Even Supreme Court Justices 
admit that the Court has generated inconsistent, oftentimes conflicting, 
standards by which to apply the Establishment Clause.31  The remainder of 
                                                                                                     
 30. E.g., Christopher D. Tomlinson, Changing the Rules of Establishment Clause 
Litigation: An Alternative to the Public Expression of Religion Act, 61 VAND. L. REV. 261, 
265 (2008) (“The few words of the . . . Establishment Clause. . . have created volumes of 
debate in recent years. . . . ”). 
 31. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment 
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this Part will seek to contextualize these excerpts within a fuller scope of 
the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence, broken into the following sub-
parts:  A. School litigation, B. Religious displays litigation, C. Ceremonial 
deism, and D. Governmental speech.  Part II demonstrates that new legal 
theories beyond the Establishment Clause are necessary for nonbelievers 
and others seeking to challenge the improper injection of religion into 
government and suggests what those new avenues might be. 
A.  School Litigation 
Decided in 1947, Everson v. Board of Education was the Supreme 
Court’s first major Establishment Clause decision.32  In that case, the Court 
held that a New Jersey program that supplied transportation to nonpublic 
school children who attended parochial schools did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.33  In Everson, the Court described the scope of the 
Establishment Clause’s prohibitions as follows: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him 
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach 
or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa.34  
This decision was followed by many more cases which attempted to 
delineate the precise extent of religious activity that is permissible in 
schools.  Categorically speaking, the Supreme Court has not found the 
                                                                                                     
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006) (describing the problems with the Establishment 
Clause and the resulting inconsistencies, noting that “[a]t some point during the last ten 
years, one or more of the nine Justices have articulated ten different Establishment Clause 
standards”). 
 32. Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 
75 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2000) (noting that schools have become the battleground for some of 
the most notable Establishment Clause disputes). 
 33. Id. at 126 (mentioning that the Everson court was unanimous in endorsing such a 
posture between church and state). 
 34. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
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establishment of voucher programs or bus transportation in support of 
school choice to amount to per se excessive entanglement between church 
and state; nor has the Supreme Court drawn a clear line demarcating 
acceptable generic educational support from impermissible endorsement of 
religious education.35  Its opinions in this area have been limited to very 
fact-specific issues, leaving lower courts to review the plethora of school 
choice challenges on a case-by-case, oftentimes piecemeal, basis.36  In 
contrast, some state Supreme Courts have found voucher programs 
unconstitutional under their respective state constitutions.37 
The Court sought to delimit the range of permissible governmental 
support for parochial schooling in Lemon v. Kurtzman.38  At stake in Lemon 
was a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the State to provide to nonpublic 
schools reimbursement for their expenses on teachers’ salaries, instructional 
materials, and books used for certain secular purposes.  The Court found 
that this arrangement constituted excessive entanglement between church 
and state.  This opinion generated the “Lemon Test” so often repeated in 
Establishment Clause litigation and so often criticized in the academic 
literature.39  Under the oft-cited Lemon Test, for a governmental practice 
that implicates religion to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, it 
must meet three requirements.  First, it must have a secular purpose.  
                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., Jason S. Marks, What Wall?  School Vouchers and Church-State 
Separation after Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58 J. MO. B. 354, 355 (2002) (detailing the 
history of the Establishment Clause). 
 36. See Michael A. Ronsenhouse, Construction and Application of Establishment 
Clause of First Amendment – U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 573 (2006) 
(explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet set up a clear test for the Establishment 
Clause).  
 37. See generally La. Fed. of Teachers v. Louisiana., Nos. 2013-CA-0120, 2013 WL 
1878913 (La. May 7, 2013); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
 38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that Pennsylvania’s statutes 
that provided financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools were 
unconstitutional); see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (holding that a 
Pennsylvania act violated the Establishment Clause by providing reimbursement to parents 
for a portion of tuition they spent sending their children to a nonpublic school).   
 39. For just a few examples from authors of diverse political perspectives, see 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 109-23 (1993); Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions 
About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 
1138 (2010); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO WASH L. REV. 743, 
762 n.87 (1992); Robert H. Bork, What to do about the First Amendment, COMMENTARY 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1995, at 23, available at http://www.commentary 
magazine.com/article/what-to-do-about-the-first-amendment/; Stephen L. Carter & Gary J. 
Stimson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 908-35 (1987). 
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Second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion.  Third, it must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion. 
School vouchers have not been the only area of school litigation 
involving the Establishment Clause.  The Court has found that when 
children go to school, including school functions like basketball games or 
graduation ceremonies, it is impermissible to inject religious components 
into these extracurricular activities.40  This includes prayer, a moment of 
silence, the teaching of religion in schools, or invocation.41 
For example, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court was faced with the issue of 
whether principals who invited members of the clergy to pray at the 
graduation ceremonies for middle school and high schools violated the 
Establishment Clause.42  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rejected what 
is referred to as the Non-Endorsement Test, discussed in Part I(B), infra, 
and suggested that, in his view, whether a practice should be deemed 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause should depend on whether 
there is direct or indirect coercion to participate in what is essentially a 
religious ritual.43  The Court framed the issue of the case as “. . . whether 
the exposure to the government’s religious expression is voluntary, and 
whether the governmental practice coerces religious belief.”44  The Court 
reasoned that, due to the circumstances of high school life, having a prayer 
at graduation ceremonies was impermissibly coercing participation in 
religious exercise.45 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Ronsenhouse, supra note 36, at 573. 
 41. E.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) 
(noting that in Marsh the Court recognized that “contemporary legislative prayers that have 
the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief” are 
impermissible). 
 42. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that a school could not provide 
for “nonsectarian” prayer to be given by clergymen selected by the school); see also Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), (prohibiting recitation of The Lord’s Prayer in 
school each morning); Engel v. Vitale, U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (finding prayer in school 
unconstitutional); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that teaching of 
religion in schools violated the Establishment Clause). 
 43. Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: 
Individualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats to 
Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1595, 1627 (1992) (“Justice Kennedy rejected the 
endorsement test entirely and proposed that a violation of the Establishment Clause should 
depend on a showing of some kind of coercion. . . . ”). 
 44. Lee, 505 U.S. at 580.  
 45. Id. at 594 (acknowledging that the government may no more use social pressure to 
enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means). 
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The Court thus analyzed the reach of the Establishment Clause under a 
coercion principle, commonly referred to as the Non-Coercion Test.46  The 
coercion principle posits that the State cannot give the impression that it 
officially endorses any particular religious belief or organization.  However, 
the Court did not set forth a definition for what would be considered 
coercion to participate or even whether the existence of coercion would be 
assessed objectively or subjectively.47  Expanding the Non-Coercion Test or 
employing it more frequently could lead to a more permissive standard of 
religious discrimination. 
There is potential for more litigation in this area, especially arising out 
of Kentucky and Mississippi.  Both states have a long history of 
Establishment Clause litigation and have continued to enact laws and pass 
resolutions that clearly defy Supreme Court jurisprudence or are intended to 
test its limits.  For example, a 2000 Kentucky law48 encourages school 
boards to inject The Lord’s Prayer with the morning Pledge of Allegiance 
in direct contravention of Stone v. Graham,49 which also arose out of a 
Kentucky bill.  That bill was passed by the spouse of the main sponsor of 
unconstitutional religious legislation and resolutions in the Commonwealth 
ever since then, Representative Tom Riner.50  An earlier Kentucky bill, 
enacted in 1990, authorized teachers covering the topic of evolution to also 
teach creationism and “read such passages in the Bible as are deemed 
                                                                                                     
 46. Eric G. Anderson, Protecting Religious Liberty Through the Establishment 
Clause: The Case of the United Effort Plan Trust Litigation, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 739, 764 
(2008). 
 47. See Holland, supra note 43, at 1601 (“[The court] felt no need to articulate a 
specific definition of coercion for future inquiries”). 
 48. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.175 (West 2012). 
 49. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky statute requiring 
posting of the ten commandments on the walls of a public school classroom had a pre-
eminent purpose which was plainly religious in nature). 
 50. See infra Part I(B)(2).  Similarly, a 2000 resolution was passed “commending 
those churches and religious organizations that pray and fast for the leaders of the 
Commonwealth and the Nation.”  H.R. Res. 191, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000) (adopted 
Apr. 14, 2000), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/recarch/00rs/hr191.htm. The Kentucky 
legislature also recently overrode the governor’s veto that was premised on significant 
constitutionality concerns, to pass a Religious Freedom Restoration Act clone law.  The law 
was set to take effect in June 2013.  See generally KY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BILL, 
http://www.kentucky.com/2013/03/30/2580631/kentuckys-religious-freedom-bill.html.  
Litigation challenging legislation requiring religious training materials and the display of a 
permanent religious plaque at the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security recently ended 
unsuccessfully for American Atheists, Inc. and the named plaintiffs that challenged it.  See 
Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Ky. Office of Homeland Sec., 133 S.Ct. 1582, 185 L.Ed. 2d 577 (Mar. 
18, 2013), cert. denied.   
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necessary for instruction on the theory of creation . . . .”51  Politically, it is 
seemingly impossible for politicians to resist such clearly unconstitutional 
antics.52  Mississippi has a similar track record and recently passed new 
legislation to attempt to overcome its prior litigation losses to again inject 
prayer into schools.53  Thus, we can look toward these two states as likely 
sources of additional case-by-case litigation concerning the Establishment 
Clause and schools. 
B.  Religious Displays Litigation 
Like the provision of governmental assistance for religious schools, 
the display of religious symbols on public property is often challenged 
under the Establishment Clause.54  Sub-Part I(B)(1) will first lay out the 
major Supreme Court cases and analytical approaches.  Sub-Part (I)(B)(2) 
will analyze the failure of the decisions based on subsequent developments 
after the Court remanded one of its lead cases, McCreary County v. 
American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,55 back to federal courts within 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  This story is not told in academic 
literature but has become a rallying point for a bold civil disobedience 
movement, which has captured the political processes in Kentucky, where 
state judges are elected rather than appointed.56  Moreover, as relayed 
below, this movement has even won significant support from multiple 
                                                                                                     
 51. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.177(1) (West 2012). 
 52. See Ian Urbina, Lawmaker in Kentucky Mixes Piety and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
4, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/us/04louisville.html?_r=0 
(quoting Al Cross, Director of the Institute for Rural Journalism and Community Issues, 
University of Kentucky: “Politicians are afraid of attack ads that will say they voted against 
God if they vote against [such] measures . . .”). 
 53. See Dave Bohon, Mississippi Legislature Passes School Prayer Bill, THE NEW 
AMERICAN (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-
morals/item/ 14743-mississippi-legislature-passes-school-prayer-bill; Ingebretsen v. Jackson 
Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing prior litigation lost by State of 
Mississippi); see also, e.g., Joe Dryden, The Religious Viewpoint Antidiscrimination Act: 
Using Students as Surrogates to Subjugate the Establishment Clause, 82 MISS. L.J. 127 
(2013) (analyzing the new wave of attempts to inject prayer back into schools); accord, 
Melissa Rogers, The Texas Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act and the 
Establishment Clause, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 939 (2009). 
 54. E.g., William M. Howard, First Amendment Challenges to Display of Religious 
Symbols on Public Property, 107 A.L.R.5th 1 (2003).  
 55. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (holding 
that a determination of these counties’ purpose in displaying the ten commandments at 
courthouses was a sound basis for ruling on the complaint). 
 56. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.040 (West 2012); §118A.050. 
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federal judges within the federal courts having jurisdiction covering the 
Commonwealth, causing great divisiveness within the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  One might even go so far to say that the 
movement has generated a constitutional crisis by calling into question the 
legitimacy of the Court in the religious arena.  Such a crisis warrants a 
response by the Court, although that response may not be the one desired by 
the non-believing minority and others opposed to the fundamentalist 
movement.57 
1.  Supreme Court Religious Displays Decisions 
At issue in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Lynch v. Donnelly58 
was a government-sponsored Christmas display that potentially constituted 
the endorsement of the Christian religious holiday.  Each year, the City of 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, set up a Christmas display at a park owned by a 
nonprofit organization.59  The display contained a variety of figures and 
decorations, including a “SEASONS GREETINGS” banner, a Christmas 
tree, a Santa Clause house, and candy cane-striped poles.60  The display also 
contained a crèche, which included animals, shepherds, kings, a baby Jesus, 
Mary, and Joseph.61  Considering the display as a whole, the Court found 
that the inclusion of the crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause.62 
The Court concluded there was a lack of evidence that the crèche’s 
inclusion was driven by religious motives.63  Thus, the Court held that the 
inclusion of the crèche had a secular purpose in the context of a generalized 
holiday display and therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause.64  
Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion setting forth what is 
commonly referred to as the “Non-Endorsement Test.”65  Under the Non-
                                                                                                     
 57. Cf.  Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us about Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2004) (“Lesson One: The Supreme Court Is not Countermajoritarian; It 
Is Nationalist”); see id. at 1551 (“Lesson Three: Courts Tend to Protect Minorities Just 
About as Much as Majorities Want Them To”); id. at 1558 (“Lesson Four: Social 
Movements Change Constitutional Law, But Not as They Intend”). 
 58. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (holding that notwithstanding the 
significance of the nativity scene, the city did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 687. 
 63. Id. at 680. 
 64. Id. at 671. 
 65. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 46, at 764. 
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Endorsement Test, a court would examine whether the practice that touches 
upon religion conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval, not-
withstanding the government’s actual intention.66  If there is either a 
positive or negative message conveyed, the court should conclude that the 
practice violates the Establishment Clause.67 
Next, in 1989, the majority opinion authored by Justice Blackmun in 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union (Parts III-A, IV, and 
V) applied the Non-Endorsement Test, stating that “[t]he Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions 
of religious belief or from making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person’s standing in the political community.”68  The case 
involved two holiday displays on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.  
The first holiday display was a crèche, depicting a Christian Nativity scene 
on the staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.  The second was an 
18-foot Chanukah menorah, which was immediately adjacent to a 45-foot 
Christmas tree located outside the government building.  The Court held 
that the crèche but not the menorah or the Christmas tree had an 
unconstitutional effect.  The Court applied the Non-Endorsement Test to 
evaluate whether the displays conveyed a message “that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”69  The Court stated that 
“[w]hen viewed in its overall context, the crèche angel’s words endorse a 
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.”70 
Two further cases help delineate the Supreme Court’s Non-
Endorsement Test.71 Next, seemingly in response to criticism72 of the 
confusing nature of its Establishment Clause, the Court granted certiorari in 
two Ten Commandments cases, Van Orden and McCreary County, both of 
which were decided June 27, 2005.73  The Court came to polar opposite 
conclusions in each case, with the Van Orden majority opinion authored by 
Justice Antonin Scalia and the McCreary County majority opinion authored 
by Justice Souter.  The different outcomes turned on whether the Ten 
                                                                                                     
 66. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor J., concurring) 
 67. Id. 
 68. Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989). 
 69. Id. at 574. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) 
(striking McCreary and Pulaski Counties Foundations Displays); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677 (finding constitutional display of Fraternal Order of Eagles monument). 
 72. See, e.g., supra note 39. 
 73. Tomlinson, supra note 30, at 272. 
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Commandments were displayed in a historic manner or whether the 
government actors displaying the Ten Commandments intended to convey a 
religious message. 
In Van Orden v. Perry, an Austin, Texas, resident had filed suit 
claiming that a 6-foot-high monolith engraved with the Ten 
Commandments on State Capitol grounds violated the Establishment 
Clause.74  The monolith was among the 17 monuments and 21 historical 
markers on the grounds.75  Declining to apply the Lemon Test, the Supreme 
Court held that the Ten Commandments display did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.76 In so doing, the Court recognized that the Ten 
Commandments played a role in our Nation’s heritage.77  Then the Court 
reasoned that the Ten Commandments, while in the presence of the other 
monuments, had historical—as opposed to religious—significance.78 
In contrast, in McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
similarly to Lynch, the Court focused more on the intent of the county 
officials displaying the Ten Commandments. The Court held that two 
counties hanging a version of the Ten Commandments, known as the 
“Foundations Displays,” on the walls of their respective courthouses 
violated the Establishment Clause because the county politicians involved 
intended to display a religious message and not a historical one.79  
Unfortunately, as relayed in Sub-Parts I(B)(2)-(3) below, the Court’s 
attempt to draw a flexible line in the sand has backfired by emboldening 
elected state legislators and judges—and even federal judges —to defy the 
Court starting immediately upon remand of McCreary County in 2005. 
2.  Supreme Court “Ignored” and “Flouted” Six Months After McCreary 
County 
The extraordinary litigation surrounding the Foundations Displays at 
issue in McCreary County demonstrates the problem, and its after-story is 
not well known despite the fact that its beginnings were reported in the New 
York Times in connection with another case arising out of the injection of 
                                                                                                     
 74. Van Orden 545 U.S. at 682. 
 75. Id. at 681. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 688. 
 78. Id. at 691. 
 79. McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); 
see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that Ten 
Commandments displays in public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause). 
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God into Kentucky legislation.  The New York Times reported about 
Kentucky Representative Tom Riner’s mission to proselytize via legislation 
in Kentucky as follows: 
Tom Riner looks for God everywhere, and in places he does not find 
him, he tries to put him there. 
 
For more than 30 years, Mr. Riner’s singular devotion has been to inject 
God into the public arena. . . . 
 
“The church-state divide is not a line I see,” Mr. Riner, a Baptist 
minister, said of [a] lawsuit [brought by American Atheists, Inc.].  
“What I do see is an attempt to separate America from its history of 
perceiving itself as a nation under God.”80 
Representative Riner has led the General Assembly to pass wildly 
unconstitutional religious bills and inject religious resolutions into various 
bills’ histories, as relayed above.81  This sets the stage to tell the rest of the 
story of the aftermath of McCreary County in the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
First, just six months after McCreary was remanded in 2005, a Sixth 
Circuit panel (The Honorable Richard F. Suhrheinrich, The Honorable 
Alice M. Batchelder, and The Honorable Walter Herbert Rice, a U.S. 
District Court Judge sitting by designation who concurred in the result 
only) seemed to defy the Court’s evaluation of the identical Foundations 
Display in McCreary County:  “[W]hat five justices of the Supreme Court 
would include in a display commemorating Kentucky and American legal 
history has no bearing on the constitutionality of the display as erected.”82    
When the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) petitioned for 
rehearing en banc, five judges filed a dissenting opinion from the denial of 
the petition: 
In order to [uphold the constitutionality of the Foundations Display], the 
panel was willing to deviate from the precedent of this Court . . . .  In 
                                                                                                     
 80. Urbina, supra note 52, at A12 (also reporting that as of 2009, the Commonwealth 
had spent $160,000 on this litigation and $400,000 as of 2005 on the McCreary County 
litigation).   
 81. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.   
 82. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty, 432 F.3d 624, 634 n.7 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the predominant purpose of the display was secular, and that the 
display would not have principal or primary effect of endorsing religion). 
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essence, the panel announced a new rule: that an overt sectarian 
legislative history is necessary, as a matter of law, before a display will 
be invalidated.  The panel premised this novel principle on a recent 
Supreme Court holding that an avowed sectarian purpose is sufficient to 
invalidate a display.  Because the most charitable characterization of the 
panel’s decision is that it makes an illogical inference, I respectfully 
dissent from the order denying en banc rehearing by this Court.83 
The dissenters continued, emphasizing that the panel “flouted” the 
Supreme Court’s charge: 
In short, the panel essentially ignored the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of the content of the Mercer County display.  The 
panel flouted the Supreme Court’s charge that the reasonable 
observer not be “absentminded,” and the panel viewed context as 
coterminous with legislative history.  Compare Mercer County, 432 
F.3d at 632 (“The objective observer has no recent history of religiously 
motivated governmental acts or resolutions to incorporate into the 
display.”) with McCreary County, 125 S.Ct. at 2737 (“The Counties’ 
position just bucks common sense; reasonable observers have 
reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to 
turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’”).  The panel 
read Mercer County’s action of quickly and exactly copying its fellow 
counties’ embattled and religiously motivated display out of the 
record.84   
Notwithstanding the emphatic dissent to the request for an en banc 
hearing, the “flouting” of the Supreme Court’s McCreary County decision 
continued.  In 2007, a federal district judge, also allowing the Foundations 
Display in the Rowan County, Kentucky courthouse to remain on the wall, 
reiterated the panel’s opinion that the Supreme Court’s McCreary County 
decision “has no bearing on the constitutionality of the display as 
erected.”85  And, in 2010, another Sixth Circuit judge openly exhibited 
hostility towards the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
based on “the Supreme Court majority’s [purported] persistent hostility to 
religion”:86 
                                                                                                     
 83.  Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 446 F.3d 651, 651-52 (five 
judge dissent) (additional internal citations omitted). 
 84. Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added). 
 85. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Rowan Cnty., 513 F.Supp.2d 889, 898-99 (E.D. Ky. 
2007) (citing Mercer Cty., 432 F.3d at 634 n.7). 
 86. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d 439, 452 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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I cannot be too critical of my . . . colleagues who feel stare decisis 
bound by the Supreme Court majority’s persistent hostility to 
religion and its refusal to acknowledge the historical evidence that 
religion, religious symbols, and the support of religious devotion were 
of the very essence of the values the Constitution’s authors and the 
ratifying legislators thought they were preserving in the language of the 
First Amendment. 
 
The result, I fear, is that federal courts will continue to close the Public 
Square to the display of religious symbols as fundamental as the Ten 
Commandments, at least until the Supreme Court rediscovers the history 
and meaning of the words of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment and jettisons the flawed reasoning of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. . . .87 
3.  Seeing the “Big Picture” from Kentucky 
At some point, one seeing all of the “baffling” displays “oddly” 
containing the Ten Commandments and religious texts, “given [their] 
content and context, understandably throws up his hands in frustration” or 
at least “would probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for 
any way to keep a religious document on the walls of the courthouse 
constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality.”88  This is 
particularly true in Kentucky, after the Supreme Court remanded the 
McCreary case, which arose out of a prominent, vibrant movement to post 
the Ten Commandments throughout the courthouses of Kentucky, the home 
of the nation’s very popular Creation Museum.89 
Although stated solely in the context of the McCreary County case, 
one Sixth Circuit judge seems to understand what has been happening: 
[T]he fact that more time has passed since the Supreme Court decision is 
meaningless in this case, because Defendants have spent the time since 
the Supreme Court decision continuously seeking to accomplish their 
initial purpose of posting the Ten Commandments as a religious 
document.  Unlike a case in which the passage of time might have some 
significance, there has been no dormant period here; Defendants have 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88.  Mercer Cnty., 446 F.3d at 653, 654-55 (Cole, J., dissenting); McCreary, 545 U.S. 
at 873. 
 89. See McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d at 446-47; CREATION MUSEUM, About the Museum,  
http://creationmuseum.org/about/ (last visited May 23, 2013). 
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continuously sought to defend their actions and accomplish what they 
initially set out to do.90 
It is “naive to assume that the reasonable observer would not be aware 
of Mercer County’s related activity of copying the disputed display,” even 
more so in light of the fact that the Supreme Court struck down the 
McCreary and Pulaski County displays under the Establishment Clause.91  
The Sixth Circuit judges who dissented from the denial of the rehearing en 
banc in the Mercer County case certainly seemed to think that the counties 
were aware of each other’s activities: 
Somehow I doubt that the Mercer County officials were surprised to 
find out that they had coincidentally erected the same display as their 
sister counties, at almost the exact same time.  Nor do I believe it a 
coincidence that the panel relegated what was by far the ACLU’s most 
powerful argument to a footnote.92 
In a number of counties, a legislative record exists to show that the 
sole governmental intent in displaying the Ten Commandments was to 
construct the display in a manner to defeat a lawsuit, that the sponsorship of 
the proposal to hang the display originated from religious leaders, and even 
that religious ceremonies occurred to commemorate the posting of the 
Foundations Display.93 
                                                                                                     
 90.  McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d at 448. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Mercer Cnty., 446 F.3d at 654 (Cole, J., dissenting); accord Am. Civil Liberties 
Untion v. Grayson Cnty., 4:01CV-202-JHM, 2008 WL 859279, at 9 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 
2008) (“An objective observer would understand that the Foundations Display’s sponsor 
desired to post the Ten Commandments in the Courthouse for purely religious reasons and 
counseled the Grayson Cnty.  Fiscal Court on how to accomplish this and avoid objection by 
the ACLU.”). 
 93. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 850-61 (6th Cir. 
2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (documenting the role of Reverend Shartzer and stating that the 
government’s stated purpose was a “sham”); Grayson Cnty., 2008 WL 859279, at 10 
(discussing  the record of government officials seeking to display Ten Commandments 
without judges having even viewed the “historical documents” in manner to defeat any 
lawsuit by the ACLU); Grayson Cnty., 605 F.3d at 430-32 (Moore, J., dissenting from 
opinion assessing costs against ACLU) (describing Reverend Shartzer and Fiscal Court 
Judge Executive Logdsdon conduct of a religious ceremony after being forced to remove the 
Foundations Display wherein Shartzer promised to “safeguard” it “until the County was 
permitted to rehang it” and Logdson’s demand that those in attendance “state their religious 
affiliation”); accord McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 851 (describing the ceremony to install 
Foundations Display overseen by county judge’s executive accompanied by his pastor).  For 
example, in the Grayson County case, Judge Logsdon, during the ceremony to begrudgingly 
remove the display, “also specifically demanded that those individuals in attendance state 
their religious affiliation or whether they agreed with [his] clear preference that the Ten 
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The ACLU has lost most of these types of suits despite the Court’s 
intervention in 2005.  In Grayson County, for example, the Sixth Circuit 
panel stated that the burden of proof in religious display suits lies with the 
challenger: 
Indeed, there may be good reason to believe that religious purpose 
underlies many of the attempts in recent years to place copies of the Ten 
Commandments in public buildings.  Nonetheless, while “the secular 
purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely 
secondary to a religious objective,” McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 
871 . . . , it is those objecting to a display of the Ten Commandments 
who bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to prove that the 
governmental entity’s secular purpose is a sham, and that an objective 
observer would understand the display to be motivated predominately 
by religion.94 
Predictably and unfortunately, the court once again ruled against the 
ACLU.  The Sixth Circuit panel’s overemphasis on the burden of proof 
allowed to stand what everyone in Kentucky knows to be true – the primary 
reasons for erecting the Foundations Display is to cross the Supreme 
Court’s line in the sand concerning the Establishment Clause and to 
demonstrate the political majority’s belief in the superiority of Christian 
faith.  As stated by Judge Moore in her dissent calling the governmental 
purpose a “sham,” “when it is a religious leader who proposes [the Ten 
Commandments] be hung . . . the desire to post the religious document 
establishes the predominant purpose, even if the government entity never 
bluntly states that purpose as its rationale.”95  An incredible video of the 
installation ceremony currently still is available on-line.96 
Those trying to force the Ten Commandments upon nonbelievers via 
the falsely historical Foundations Display have learned to leave a sanitized 
record to help them overcome court challenges to their “choreographed” 
identical displays in at least four other Kentucky counties, and they have 
                                                                                                     
Commandments remain in place.”  Grayson Cnty., 605 F.3d at 431-32 (Moore, J., 
dissenting).  He “then chastised an individual who desired to remain unaffiliated for not 
supporting the Ten Commandments and deemed that individual to be against the religious 
text.”  Id. at 432.  This is a clear example of a Kentucky government official “making 
religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.”  Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 94. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 856 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 95. Id. at 859 n.3 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 96. A video showing hundreds singing Amazing Grace during the ceremony is 
available here:  http://www.kentucky.com/2010/01/19/1100913/crowd-praises-the-return-of-
10.html. 
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become emboldened to violate the Establishment Clause in other ways that 
some might describe as “more subtle.”97  Unfortunately, some Kentucky 
courts seem to go along pretending that knowledge about the Foundations 
Display cannot penetrate county lines.  As stated by the five Sixth Circuit 
judges who dissented from the denial of the rehearing en banc in Mercer 
County: “The panel pointed to no changes of constitutional significance 
since McCreary County, unless the panel would constitutionalize the fifty 
miles of Kentucky between the courthouses.”98  Furthermore, “[a]s the 
panel acknowledged, the stories of the Ten Commandment displays erected 
in the State of Kentucky are intertwined.  In the summer of 1999, two 
bordering counties (McCreary and Pulaski) erected identical Ten 
Commandments displays.  Both displays were successfully challenged by 
the ACLU . . . .”99  Meanwhile, within four months of the district court 
order enjoining the final McCreary and Pulaski county displays, four other 
counties (Mercer, Rowan, Garrard, and Grayson) exactly copied those 
displays; all were identical.  In fact, on appeal from the resulting ACLU 
challenge, the panel in Mercer County held the case in abeyance, precisely 
“[b]ecause the challenged display [was] identical in all material respects to 
the third and final display in McCreary County.”100 
The Supreme Court denied the most recent petition for certiorari filed 
in McCreary County, which emphasized the seeming meaninglessness of 
the Establishment Clause within the Commonwealth, and the Court has 
been uninterested in granting certiorari in other religious display litigation 
seeking to clarify the Lemon Test.101  As a result, even within the federal 
                                                                                                     
 97. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mercer Cnty., 446 F3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 627-28 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (describing how improper religious favoritism may be exercised in “more 
subtle” ways than “overt efforts at government proselytization”).  The Honorable Karen 
Nelson Moore of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wisely relied on 
widely disseminated media reports, which some might argue is in tension with Justice 
O’Connor’s focus on “traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, 
and implementation of the statute.’”  Am. Civil Liberties Union v. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 
844, 862 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor also stated of Stone and other 
cases:  “In each case, the government’s action was held unconstitutional only because openly 
available data supported a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the 
government’s action.” Id. 
 98. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mercer Cnty., 446 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(five judge dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (internal citation omitted). 
 99. Id. at 652. 
 100. Id. at 652 (quoting Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d at 626). 
 101. See Davenport v. Am. Atheists, 132 S.Ct. 12 (Oct. 31, 2011) (No. 08-4061) 
(denying certiorari); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n  v. American Atheists, 132 S.Ct. 12 (Oct. 
31, 2011) (Nos. 10-1276, 10-1297) (same); McCreary, 131 S.Ct. 1474 (Feb 22, 2011) (No. 
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courts that have jurisdiction within the borders of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, judges have “flouted” the Supreme Court’s directive to evaluate 
in good faith facially suspicious102 governmental words or deeds 
explainable by nothing other than religious motivation, thereby crossing the 
Establishment Clause line. Thus, both the legislature and many courts in the 
very religious Commonwealth remain impervious to the plight of those 
seeking to preserve the church-state divide. 
C.  Ceremonial Deism 
Ceremonial Deism cases concern longstanding ritualistic references to 
God in various governmental contexts.103  “Courts have generally stated in 
holdings and dicta that ceremonial deism is constitutional because these 
phrases have lost their religious meaning through the passage of time or 
rote repetition.”104  For instance, the national motto, “In God We Trust,” has 
been mandatorily printed on coins since 1955 and is now considered 
constitutional ceremonial deism due to its longstanding history and 
purported secular, ritualistic goal, which trump its religious content.105 
                                                                                                     
10-566) (same).  The petitions for certiorari in each of these cases emphasized the need for 
clarification of the Lemon test: Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Davenport v. American 
Atheists, 2011 WL 1540434 (No. 10-1297); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utah Highway 
Patrol Ass'n v. American Atheists, 2011 WL 1495152 (No. 10-1276); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, McCreary Cnty., 2010 WL 4314343 (No. 10-566).  But see, Salazar v. Buono, 
559 U.S. 700 (2010) (remanding the case concerning transfer of land in Mojave National 
Preserve holding Latin Cross erected in 1934 by members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars). 
 102. The five judge dissent employed the term “facially suspicious,” which should 
justify fully shifting the burden of proof in Establishment Clause cases to the government to 
show the absence of religious motivation and effect.  Cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005) 708 (Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“In my judgment, at 
the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption against the display 
of religious symbols on public property.”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989) (partial concurrence and dissent of Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and 
Stevens, J.) (“In my opinion the Establishment Clause should be construed to create a strong 
presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property.”).  Otherwise, now 
that those manipulating government as personal pulpits know simply to leave no written 
religious fingerprints to the record to defeat almost any challenge, even if everyone knows 
the true intent is religious favoritism.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mercer Cnty., 446 
F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 2005) (using “facially suspicious” language). 
 103. For resources on ceremonial deism, see Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the 
Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer 
and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010); Christopher 
C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009). 
 104. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and 
Change In Meaning, 59 Duke L.J. 705, 707 (2010). 
 105. Corbin I, supra note 25, at 1546. 
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These cases best illustrate how history and longstanding practices can 
be construed to protect what would otherwise likely be an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion.  In 2004, in the case of Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court dismissed on standing grounds a 
challenge to students’ recitation of the phrase “under God” within the 
Pledge of Allegiance, which had been added to the Pledge in 1954.106  In 
dicta, the Court clearly stated that it would not have found a violation of the 
Establishment Clause in the case.107  Similarly, in Marsh v. Chambers, the 
Supreme Court looked to 18th century practices of Congress when it held 
that the Nebraska legislature’s practice of opening every session with a 
prayer by a chaplain (paid for by public funds) did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.108 
A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit very recently utilized the 
Endorsement Test in a seeming ceremonial deism case arising out of 
Greece, New York.109  The Supreme Court also granted a writ of certiorari 
to decide whether the town board’s practice of opening session with a 
prayer from the “chaplain of the month” —usually someone invoking a 
Christian faith—violates the Establishment Clause.110  The stakes are high, 
but this Article will leave it to other experts to make predictions about the 
outcome or how the Court might utilize the platform of the case to improve 
or further mar its jumbled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.111  While 
                                                                                                     
 106. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004) (holding that a 
father lacked standing to bring action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of 
school districts’ policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that the challenged practice did 
not violate the establishment clause); see also Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 
F.3d 1007, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Congress 
added “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance to indoctrinate children with belief in God, 
not just country). 
 109. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 
WL 2149803 (May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696) (finding an Establishment Clause violation 
because prayer practice impermissibly endorsed a Christian viewpoint). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Rick Garnett, More on the Town of Greece, PRAWFSBLAWG, (May 20, 2013, 
12:51 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/05/more-on-the-town-of-
greece.html; Paul Horwitz, Beware of Town of Greece Bearing Gifts, PRAWFSBLAWG, May 
20, 2013, 10:18 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/05/beware-of-town-
of-greece-bearing-gifts.html; Eugene Volokh, New Establishment Clause Case for the 
Supreme Court, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 20, 2013, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/05/20/new-establishment-clause-case-for-the-supreme-court/; 
see generally Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality (2013); 
Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
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much more could be written about the ceremonial deism doctrine, for 
purposes of this Article the point is simple:  time is an obstacle in religious 
liberty litigation, because over time, courts tend to justify what would 
otherwise be unconstitutional practices by pointing to their longstanding, 
and thus historical, nature. 
D.  Governmental Speech Doctrine 
It is this author’s—perhaps minority—opinion, like that of Professor 
Corbin, that “government religious speech harms both the equality and 
liberty of nonbelievers.”112  This author believes that the main purpose of 
the Establishment Clause is to protect religious minorities, including the 
nonbelievers.113  However, government religious speech is common and has 
often gained the Court’s blessing, as in the creation of the government 
speech doctrine in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum in 2009.114 
In Pleasant Grove v. Summum, the issue was whether a city’s denial of 
permission to a private organization seeking to place a religious monument 
in a park violated the Establishment Clause.  Pioneer Park was a public park 
located in the Historic District of Pleasant Grove City, Utah.  The park 
contained fifteen permanent displays, including an historic granary, a 
September 11 monument, a wishing well, the Ten Commandments, and the 
City’s first fire station.115  Eleven of the fifteen existing displays were 
donated to the park by private sources.  A minority religious organization 
then sought permission to display a stone monument containing the Seven 
Aphorisms of Summum,116 but the government denied the requisite 
permit.117 
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito, set 
forth the framework under which the parties’ Establishment Clause 
                                                                                                     
727 (2009); PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2011); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perception, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
 112. Corbin II, supra note 27, at 349. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (holding that by 
allowing placement of donated permanent monuments in a public park, the city was 
exercising a form of government speech not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech 
Clause). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CREATION, SEVEN SUMMUM PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml. 
 117. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. at 466. 
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arguments would be evaluated.118  The Court first determined whether the 
displays were considered government speech, as opposed to governmental 
regulation of private speech (which would be subject to strict scrutiny).119  
The Court held that the private displays donated for erection on public 
property amounted to governmental speech.120  The Court then found that 
the city choosing not to display the stone monument was constitutional, 
because it could not be forced to engage in any particular speech.121  The 
Court reasoned that, while the challengers to the display saw the 
monuments as an expression by the government, each individual has the 
ability to develop his or her own interpretation of it.122  Justice Alito then 
distinguished private speech such as temporary displays (Christmas trees 
and Menorah) from permanent monuments on public property, which 
would be considered government speech.123  In light of the Summum case, 
which “has truly frightening implications for free speech law,”124 it may 
prove difficult to force via judicial fiat inclusion of non-majority viewpoints 
as a means of remedying one-sided displays.  This is but one of many 
strategic difficulties nonbelievers face in mounting constitutional 
challenges to government-sponsored religious expression. 
III.  Nonbelievers Need New Litigation Strategies 
Nonbelievers and others seeking to use the courts to enforce the 
constitutionally required church-state divide need new litigation strategies 
for two primary reasons:  (1) the above-discussed case law and turnover on 
the Court has made litigation under the Establishment Clause risky, and (2) 
discrimination against non-believers in the nation’s conservative heartland 
is on the rise, leading to further ostracization of non-believers from the 
democratic process.  Both of these issues, as well as suggestions for new 
strategies, will be discussed in sub-parts A, B, and C, below. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 462. 
 119. Id. at 470. 
 120. Id. at 471. 
 121. Id. at 479. 
 122. Id. at 478. 
 123. Id. at 480. 
 124. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Dangerous Free Speech Ruling, 45 TRIAL 60 (July 2009). 
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A.  Inconsistent Case Law and Heightened Litigation Risk 
The Supreme Court has yet to find any single principle that 
consistently drives a majority in Establishment Clause cases.125  There is 
unpredictability.  For example, in Van Orden, the Court stated that the 
Lemon Test was not useful in the case,126 while it employed the Lemon Test 
in McCreary County which was decided on the same day.127  The difference 
between the outcomes was due to Justice Breyer voting differently in each 
case.128  Justice Breyer did not seem to use any specific Establishment 
Clause test, but said that Justices should just use their “legal judgment” in 
cases like this.129  “At some point during the last ten years, one or more of 
the nine Justices have articulated ten different Establishment Clause 
standards.”130 
Further, “Justice O’Connor’s Non-Endorsement approach may seem 
more focused, but uncertainties about what behavior constitutes 
endorsement greatly reduces its apparent simplicity.”131  Nor has the Non-
Endorsement Test commanded a Court majority.132  Justice Kennedy has 
rejected the Non-Endorsement Test completely and suggested the 
constitutionality of actions challenged under the Establishment Clause 
should turn on whether there is some kind of coercion.133  Lee v. Weisman, 
authored by Justice Kennedy, crystallized the issue of the case as “whether 
the exposure to the government’s religious expression is voluntary, and 
whether the governmental practice coerces religious belief.”134  As Justice 
Kennedy noted, coercion “may not be limited to the context of public 
schools . . . .”135  Although Lee did not indicate who beyond high school 
children should not have to endure being put “in the dilemma of 
participating, with all that implies, or protesting,”136 the reality in many 
                                                                                                     
 125. Anderson, supra note 46, at 762. 
 126. Tomlinson, supra note 30, at 273. 
 127. McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005). 
 128. Tomlinson, supra note 30, at 288.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Gey, supra note 31, at 725. 
 131. Greenawalt, supra note 39, at 1138. 
 132. Anderson, supra note 46, at 764. 
 133. Holland, supra note 43, at 1627. 
 134. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 580, 580 (1992). 
 135. Id. at 592 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 
661) (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 136. Id. 
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parts of the country is that nearly everyone is subject to enormous pressure 
to conform. 
Litigation under the Establishment Clause today poses risks to 
nonbelievers seeking to challenge improper injection of religion into 
government.  As previously noted, the current analysis under the 
Establishment Clause is highly criticized for being inconsistent, 
unpredictable, and confusing.137  The Court applies different tests, or 
interprets the same test differently, or Justices switch votes depending on 
the facts, which all equals to uncertainty for the nonbelievers seeking 
justice in the court systems. 
Moreover, many would posit that the composition of the conservative 
Roberts Court renders challenges by nonbelievers under the Establishment 
less likely to succeed.138  Indeed, there is real concern that the Roberts 
Court might abandon the current analysis under Establishment Clause for a 
more pro-religion standard.139  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, respectively, 
leaving uncertainty surrounding the prospects that the Establishment Clause 
will continue to find majority support to protect nonbelievers.140  A five-
justice consensus could emerge to all but obliterate standing for 
organizations or individuals to bring this type of litigation under the 
Establishment Clause.141 
In light of the opinions in Van Orden and McCreary County, it appears 
that Justices Scalia, Thomas, and probably Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito do 
not agree with Justice O’Connor’s view that the Establishment Clause 
protects an equality interest.142 Justice-counting is never certain, 
however.143  Inconsistencies result when justices switch sides, and the 
                                                                                                     
 137. See E.g., Gey, supra note 31, at 725. 
 138. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723 (2011) 
(hereinafter “Chemerinsky I”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply 
to the Right, 12 THE GREEN BAG 2d 413 (2009) (hereinafter “Chemerinsky II”). 
 139. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 579, 666 (2011) (hereinafter “Chemerinsky III”). 
 140. Chemerinsky I, supra note 138, at 742. 
 141. Cf. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (finding 
organization’s challenge to “faith-based initiatives” did not fall within narrow exception on 
taxpayer standing set forth in Flast v. Cohen, 32 U.S. 83 (1968)). 
 142. Chemerinsky III, supra note 139, at 678. 
 143. E.g., Mark Sherman, John Roberts’ Health Care Decision Draws More Nuanced 
Look at Chief Justice’s Tenure, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/02/john-roberts-health-care-decision_n_ 
1642739.html. 
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majority changes its analysis.  Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy were 
predominantly considered the swing votes.144  Further, even the articulation 
of the applicable tests can vary, causing inconsistent results.  Justice 
Kennedy, predicted by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky to be the most 
important swing vote in the Establishment Clause arena on the current 
court,145 seems to adhere to the case-by-case coercion test.146  Thus, 
personnel changes on the Court make it difficult to predict future outcomes 
in Establishment Clause cases. 
The Court has not yet decided enough cases using the coercion theory 
to predict authoritatively what would amount to coercion in a close case.147  
But the City of Greece148 case provides the Court a platform to how to 
rectify the Marsh ceremonial deism doctrine with the Lemon Endorsement 
Test.149  How it will do so – or whether it will attempt to adopt one 
controlling principle, such as the coercion principle – is anyone’s guess.  As 
of right now, the outcome of any Establishment Clause analysis remains 
highly case-specific and impossible to predict in all but the most obvious of 
cases.150 
In any event, as observed by one scholar, “the First Amendment 
clauses are less effective when the problem is neither interference nor true 
coercion, but unequal treatment.”151  Therefore, nonbelievers should seek 
new avenues to challenge religious discrimination. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 144. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 
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 145. Chemerinsky III, supra note 139. 
 146. Gey, supra note 144, at 740. 
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 149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (defining the Lemon Test as: (1) the 
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B.  Risking Discrimination and Alienation 
The problem of present-day discrimination and alienation of non-
believers is quite real.  Supported by surveys and a litany of sources, 
Professor Corbin recently made the following well-supported succinct 
observation: “Nonbelievers still make up a small minority in the United 
States, and they remain disliked, distrusted, and not truly American in the 
eyes of many.  As a result, many atheists are hesitant to reveal their 
religious views, and those who do risk discrimination or attack.”152  
Nonbelievers are victims of stereotypes, prejudices, and hatred.  For 
example, just across from its Kentucky suburbs in Cincinnati, Ohio, a 
landowner received death threats after the leased billboard on his land 
displayed the message:  “Don’t believe in God?  You’re not alone.”153  He 
reneged on the lease.154  In Kentucky, a billboard was erected that depicted 
a boy pointing a gun at the viewer with the following quote: “If God 
doesn’t matter to him, do you?”155  Even in the wake of the devastating 
Oklahoma City tornado, an atheist survivor shared an awkward moment 
with a CNN reporter asking her if she thanked God she was alive.156   
Notwithstanding the cultural ostracism often faced by nonbelievers, if the 
Supreme Court stays true to a core purpose of the Establishment Clause and 
protects minorities, it can send a message to citizens to accept nonbelievers 
in our society. 
According to a University of Minnesota study, atheists are the most 
despised minority in the United States.157  In 1999, a Gallup Poll 
                                                                                                     
 152. Corbin II, supra note 27, at 349; accord Gervais W. M., et al., Do You Believe in 
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 155. See generally BILLBOARD WARS, DANGERGOUS TALK, http://www.dangerous 
talk.net/billboard-wars.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
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the Lord,’ HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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Atheists, ABOUT.COM, http://atheism.about.com/od/atheistbigotryprejudice/a/Atheist 
Surveys.htm (last visited July 28, 2012). 
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demonstrated that even if an atheist were qualified as President, 45 percent 
of Americans would not vote for that candidate.158  “Americans rated 
atheists as the group that least agrees with their vision of America and the 
group that they would most disapprove of their children marrying.”159  
Recent polls found that in parts of the country with religious majorities, 
atheists were the least liked people.160  This prejudice against atheists is 
predominantly due to a feeling of distrust, which “generalized even to 
participants from more liberal, secular populations.”161  “A description of a 
criminally untrustworthy individual was seen as comparably representative 
of atheists and rapists but not representative of Christians, Muslims, Jewish 
people, feminists or homosexuals.”162  Further, studies showed that this 
belief is premised upon the assumption that most people believe that those 
who have a relationship with God and believe God is watching them will 
behave better than those who don’t believe.163  “[A]theists were 
systematically socially excluded only in high-trust domains; belief in God, 
but not authoritarianism, predicted this discriminatory decision-making 
against atheists in high trust domains.”164  Thus, distrust and political 
ostracism of atheists in America is a true problem needing a remedy. 
C.  Seeking New Strategies 
Just as there is a movement to inject God into American politics, there 
is a countermovement among non-believers to use the courts to uphold the 
constitutional church-state divide.  Among those who have filed litigation 
recently are the ACLU;165 American Atheists, Inc.;166 Freedom From 
Religion Foundation;167 Michael Newdow, an individual attorney in 
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California,168 and other groups and individuals.  Any civil rights movement 
involving a diverse array of uncoordinated actors runs the risk of 
individuals pulling in opposite directions.  My thinking in putting this 
Article into the public domain is to generate conversation among the 
various groups and individuals to maximize the movement’s chances of 
success.  The remainder of this sub-part will attempt to do this by 
discussing American Atheists’ newest litigation against the IRS and how it 
might lead to new strategies for those seeking to uphold the church-state 
divide, including by drawing some lessons from the landmark litigation 
from the civil rights era, Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka.169 
American Atheists, Inc. is an advocacy organization that often brings 
litigation to challenge Establishment Clause violations.  Its most recent 
litigation challenging the Internal Revenue Service’s preferential treatment 
of churches and religious organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) seeks to 
open this new path.  The basis of American Atheists’ complaint is rooted in 
the Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of “non-profit” status: 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) distinguishes between entities that are religious in 
nature, on the one hand, and those that are charitable, scientific, testing 
for the public safety, literary, educational, or dedicated to amateur 
athletics or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, on the other. 
“Religious organizations” and “churches” are treated differently from all 
other organizations entitled to tax exemptions under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
Additionally, under the IRS’s application of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), churches 
receive certain preferences that even religious organizations do not.170 
American Atheists argues that such treatment violates Equal Protection 
principles inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the 
Religious Test Clause of Article VI, § 3 of the Constitution, and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Sub-part 1 below will flesh 
out very briefly the Equal Protection argument, including some lessons 
from Brown, while Sub-part 2 will briefly introduce the Religion Test 
Clause argument.  As the purpose of this Article is to develop new legal 
                                                                                                     
many significant legal accomplishments nationwide.”). 
 168. Michael Newdow– Biography, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Newdow (last visited May 28, 2013) (“He is best 
known for his efforts to have recitations of the current version of the Pledge of Allegiance in 
public schools declared unconstitutional.”). 
 169. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (holding that 
segregation denied plaintiffs equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 170. E.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Am. Atheists, Inc., v. 
Shulman, No. 12-264 (Dec. 20, 2012) (on file with author).  
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theories, the Establishment Clause arguments are not discussed herein.  The 
litigation is at the incipient stages and would benefit from strategic 
brainstorming from the broader community seeking to preserve the church-
state divide. 
1.  Equal Protection and Lessons from Brown 
American Atheists, in its complaint, claims that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
violates the Equal Protection principles inherent in the Fifth Amendment in 
that it discriminates between entities solely on the basis of whether they 
profess deistic beliefs.171  Courts commonly have used the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect minorities from 
discriminatory laws.172  The Court has extended this protection to prevent 
discrimination based on gender, alienage, illegitimacy and burdens on 
fundamental rights, such as voting and free speech.173  So it seems that 
Equal Protection principles could apply to bar religious discrimination 
against atheists. 
In Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, the Court held that separate schools 
for African Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.174  In Brown, the Court famously held that separate 
was not equal, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.175  The Court relied upon the 
poignant – yet scientifically weak – doll study as evidence of this 
inequality.176  The Court stated, “to separate [Black students] from others of 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. 
 172. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948) (holding that courts cannot enforce 
racial covenants in real estate); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that 
intimate sexual conduct is part of the liberty covered by due process). 
 173. E.g., id. 
 174. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (“[T]hey have been denied 
admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting 
segregation according to race.  This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 
U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 370 U.S. 483 
(1954) (“At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle 
that the government must treat citizens as individuals and not as members of racial, ethnic, 
or religious groups.”)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, REWRITING BROWN, IN WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (critiquing the Court’s use of the 
doll study in footnote 11); Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science 
Evidence, and Equal Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 866-69 (2008) (“Most leading constitutional scholars today 
(granted, with the considerable benefit of hindsight) eschew the particular evidentiary path 
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similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”177  The Court went 
even further by stating that this feeling of inferiority, undergirded by law, 
would affect the children’s ability and desire to learn. 
Social science demonstrating the effects of a particular law could be of 
relevance in religious cases as well.  On the other hand, moving the Court 
to accept such evidence outside the context of school litigation might be 
difficult, because the Supreme Court “has been particularly vigilant in 
monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and 
secondary schools.”178 
So, what can the movement to uphold the church-state divide learn 
from Brown to shift its focus more toward Equal Protection principles, 
rather than the Establishment Clause?  To at least two other scholars, it is 
surprising that Equal Protection principles have never been a cornerstone 
for religious cases.179  I do not mean in this Article, however, to 
overemphasize or imply exactly how social science data might be used.  In 
fact, I am hoping this Article will lead to new ideas and voices heard on the 
subject.  As explained by Justice Thomas in Missouri v. Jenkins:180 
Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-
science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental, truth 
that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis 
of race. . . . At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as 
individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.  It 
is for this reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the 
strictest of scrutiny . . . .181 
Strategies are necessary to try to avoid similar shortcomings 
experienced since Brown.  Extraordinarily insightful commentators have 
                                                                                                     
taken by the Court in Brown.”); accord Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote 11 in 
Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 793, 803-14 (2002); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 177. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).  
 178. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987). 
 179. Gellman & Looper-Feldman, supra note 12, at 667. 
 180. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (overturning District Court ruling that 
required the state of Missouri to correct de facto racial inequality in schools by funding 
salary increases and remedial education programs). 
 181. See id. at 120-121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that a school is 
black does not mean that it is the product of a constitutional violation.”). 
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documented that the Court is moving away from fulfilling the promises of 
Brown.182  Some originalists might even maintain that Brown itself was an 
unconstitutional decision—or at least deeply flawed constitutionally even if 
generally socially desirable.183  At least one scholar has come close to 
predicting the demise of social statistics as being useful in modern 
educational opportunity litigation.184  Some commentators are particularly 
critical of “the Court turning to such evidence in constitutional cases, 
especially those involving the equal protection clause.”185  Nonetheless, 
despite such obstacles, one lesson to derive from the epic Brown litigation 
is that relying too narrowly on a single remedial theory for too long can 
eventually backfire.186 
In sum, one of my intents in writing this Article is to generate a 
dialogue among those interested in developing the Equal Protection angle to 
the First Amendment.  This is in the spirit of what Professor Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., constitutional law scholar, did on the fiftieth anniversary of 
Brown, when he wrote in an excellent essay trying to preserve some of 
Brown’s lessons: 
                                                                                                     
 182. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Justice 
Roberts’s Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Equality 
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over 
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 n.10 (2004); Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law 
in the 1980’s: The Court’s Abandonment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 7 (1984). 
 183. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1883 (1995) (criticizing an 
argument in favor of Brown being constitutional on the grounds the argument “fails to show 
either that Brown is correct on originalist grounds, or even, as he more modestly claims, that 
Brown is within the legitimate range of interpretations’ of the Fourteenth Amendment”); 
Ronald Turner, Was “Separate But Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and 
Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229 (1995) (exploring the originalism arguments 
counter to Judge Bork’s theorizing that Brown could be squared with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 184. Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal 
Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
863, 883 (2008) (“Reliance on social science evidence in judicial decisions, especially in 
constitutional cases, continues to make scholars and courts uneasy.”).  But see generally 
Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
 185. Heise, supra note 184, at 885. 
 186. E.g., Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of Educational 
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 204 (2005) (noting limits of a one 
directional strategy in desegregation litigation); see also Martha Minnow, Surprising 
Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2004) (discussing various 
aspects of law and society beyond race relations impacted by Brown). 
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As we reflect on fifty years of Brown in the context of where we are 
today as a country of diverse people, we have a clearer sense of its 
successes and failures and the challenge for the future.  In the pages that 
follow, my goal is to share my assessment of Brown and its progeny, in 
the hope that others will seek solutions to these problems and meet the 
laudable goals of Brown, which have, regrettably, thus far not been 
achieved.187 
In contrast to the doll study used in Brown, recently gathered statistics 
demonstrating large numbers of fellow Americans’ attitudes towards 
atheists are far more scientifically reliable given the large sample sizes.188  
In many of the cases that fall within the four broad areas of the 
Establishment Clause discussed above, the problem is not that people 
necessarily feel, at least not strictly, that strong-willed nonbelievers are 
being coerced; they feel that they are being ostracized by government actors 
for being non-Christian, that they are being rendered outsiders, second-class 
citizens, and less “American” than the Christian majority.189  This ostracism 
discourages participation in the political process, which serves to encourage 
political insiders to cater further to the majority at the expense of 
nonbelievers.190  For example, in recent litigation, almost 35 of the 38 
members of the Kentucky Senate signed an amicus brief authored by Roy 
Moore191 encouraging the elected appellate court judges not to follow the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the grounds that it purportedly 
contravenes the First Amendment.192  Ninety-six Kentucky House of 
Representative members – out of a total of only one hundred – signed a 
corresponding brief seeking to revive Justice David Josiah Brewer’s 
                                                                                                     
 187. Charles J. Ogletree, The Significance of Brown, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 12 
(2004). 
 188. See supra notes 134 - 136 and accompanying text. 
 189. Gellman, supra note 19, at 666. 
 190. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text; see also, Doe v. Harlan Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (2000) (striking down clearly unconstitutional Kentucky law 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public classroom in Kentucky); 
Roark v. South Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (striking school 
district’s practice of allowing Bibles to be distributed in fifth grade classrooms by 
evangelical Christians). 
 191. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
 192. Brief for Thirty-Five Kentucky State Senators as Amicus Curiae, Kentucky Office 
of Homeland Security v. Christerson, 371 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 2009-CA-
001676), at 7, available at http://www.morallaw.org/PDF/KYSENATORS_FM 
LAMICUS%20BRIEF_5_10_10.pdf. 
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widely-discredited statement in Church of The Holy Trinity v. United 
States193 that the United States is a “Christian nation.”194 
While there is always risk of backlash, such as is apparent in the 
“billboard wars,”195 the Court’s protection of atheists’ individual liberties 
could lead to more widespread acceptance of them by more Americans.  If 
the law continues to be used as a tool to ostracize nonbelievers, their status 
as second-class citizens in most of the country will become further 
entrenched.  Take the following examples, which while focused on atheists, 
are relevant to all those interested in preserving the church-state divide.  
The idea that atheists should be deemed incompetent to serve as witnesses 
“was not put to rest in America until well into the twentieth century” and 
still lingers unchallenged in multiple state constitutions.196  Atheism can 
even impact one’s likelihood of being awarded custody or adoption of 
children.197  People also have been forced out of non-religious jobs for 
being atheist.198 
Various Supreme Court opinions have acknowledged the alienation of 
nonbelievers: 
                                                                                                     
 193. Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding that a minister is 
not a foreign laborer under the statute even though he was a foreigner). 
 194. Brief for Thirty-Five Kentucky State Senators, supra note 191, at 18, available at 
http://kysecurity.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/motion-2_0001.pdf; see also Steven K. 
Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the “Christian Nation” Maxim, 63 ALA. L. REV. 
427, 427-28 (1999) (“Judges and commentators have panned the Christian nation 
pronouncement as ‘arrogant’ and ‘anachronistic,’ an ‘aberration,’ or at best, as stating a mere 
‘truism.’”).  Even Justice Brewer himself did not seem to truly believe the mantra had legal 
significance.  See DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION 12 (1905). 
 195. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
 196. Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: A Historical and Prudential Analysis of 
Oaths As Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in 
America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 26 n.10 (2009); see generally Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 
(1961) (striking Maryland constitution religious test required of notary public applicant); 
Paul W. Kaufman, Note, Disbelieving Nonbelievers:  Atheism, Competence, and Credibility 
in the Turn of the Century American Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (2003) 
(describing ineligibility to serve as witnesses, jurors, notaries public and other public 
offices). 
 197. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 633-35 (2006). 
 198. E.g., Robert F. Worth, From Bible-Belt Pastor to Atheist Leader, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/magazine/from-bible-belt-
pastor-to-atheist-leader.html?_r=1 (describing frequency of even preachers losing faith and 
level of discrimination against atheists including loss of employment in non-religious 
sectors). 
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 “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite message.”199  
“When the government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it 
conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the 
favored beliefs.”200 
“The issue before us today is not the abstract philosophical question 
whether the alternative of frustrating this desire of a religious majority is 
to be preferred over the alternative of imposing “psychological 
coercion,” or a feeling of exclusion, upon nonbelievers.  Rather, the 
question is whether the United States Constitution has imposed a 
mandatory choice in favor of the former.  As the age-old practices of our 
people show, “the answer to that question is not at all in doubt.”201 
In looking to the view of this unusually informed observer, this Court 
inquires whether the sign or display “sends the ancillary message 
to . . . nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.’”202 
I conclude this sub-part with the proposal that despite the 
shortcomings of Brown and its progeny,203 the Equal Protection theory 
should be developed to try to stem the political ostracism of nonbelievers.  
Establishment Clause theories seem to be losing traction.  This risk could 
come to a head in City of Greece,204 if the Roberts Court undermines the 
Court’s prior progression toward solidifying the Establishment Clause’s 
protection of nonbelievers, perhaps by raising the bar as to standing.205 
                                                                                                     
 199. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 200. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 (1992) (emphasis added) 
 201. Id. at 646 (1992). 
 202.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 203. E.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms 
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111 (1997) (stating that by condoning 
neutral actions the Court legitimizes practices that perpetual racial disparities). 
 204. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found, 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (finding 
organization’s challenge to “faith-based initiatives” did not fall within narrow exception on 
taxpayer standing set forth in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)). 
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2.  Religious Test Clause 
American Atheists also seeks to develop the theory that provisions of 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) violate the Religious Test Clause of Article 6 § 3 of the 
Constitution.  The Religion Test Clause states:  “no religious test shall ever 
be required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust.”206  American 
Atheists argues that the Office of Commissioner of the IRS is 
impermissibly denying a benefit to nonbelievers solely because of their 
failure to fulfill an IRS test of qualifying as a religious organization or 
church.  I will briefly summarize the modern theoretical grounds below.207 
There is precious, little evidence of what the Founders contemplated 
by “public Trust,”208 but standard rules of statutory construction dictate that 
it must mean something other than an “Office” because of the two terms’ 
separation by the word “or.”209  There is some contemporary authority to 
support the theory that a modern 501(c)(3) entity, which fills charitable 
voids that otherwise would be likely to burden the government, does, 
indeed, qualify as a “public Trust.”  For example, Professor Robert A. 
Destro squarely theorizes that non-profit entities receiving public funds are 
“public Trusts,” although he comes to the conclusion that prohibiting 
religious entities from being eligible to receive public funds on an equal 
footing with non-religious entities effectively applies a religious test against 
the religiously-oriented entities.210  He basically argues for a shift to 
presume that all entities seeking federal funds can fulfill the non-religious 
                                                                                                     
 206. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; see also, Girouard v. U.S., 328 U.S. 61 (1965) (holding 
that an alien who wishes to enter into the U.S. could not be barred from entering the country 
due to religious beliefs, reasoning that there could be no religious test for citizenship with no 
similar test for holding office); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)  (holding a 
provision in the Maryland Constitution that required a religious test, a declaration of belief 
in God, in order to hold office as unconstitutional); Luke Beck, The Constitutional 
Prohibition on Religious Tests, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 323, 330 (2011) (“Perhaps surprisingly, 
the current constitutions of Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas all contain religious tests.”). 
 207. For more historical discussion, see generally Response in Opposition to The 
United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Am. Atheists v. Werfel, No. 2:12-cv-00265 (E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 6, 2013), ECF No. 22. 
 208. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious 
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 714 (1987). 
 209. SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 24.14 (5th ed. 1990) (“Generally, 
courts presume that “or” is used in a statute disjunctively unless there is clear legislative 
intent to the contrary.”). 
 210. See generally Robert A. Destro, Equal Treatment: Implications for Nonprofit 
Organizations, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (Stephen V. 
Mansma & J. Christopher Soper, eds., 1998). 
314 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275 (2013) 
objective to be funded, rather than the other way around.211  Nonetheless, 
we are in agreement that the First and Fourteenth Amendments supplement 
the Religious Test Clauses of Article VI and rest on entirely separate 
theoretical ground.212 
Other scholars have theorized in a related manner.  Two scholars 
pondering the manner in which American society provides care to child 
abuse victims pondered the “public Trust” concept in the context of relying 
on religiously affiliated entities to provide so much of this service.213  They 
noted, “[i]t is unclear what standards a private, religious organization must 
meet in fulfilling a public trust.”214  They also noted, as is a common issue 
in sovereign and governmental immunity in the outsourcing age,215 “[i]t is 
unclear as to when the activity of a private actor becomes state action.”216  
A leading dictionary dating back to the time of the Founding supports the 
argument.217 
                                                                                                     
 211. See generally Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (holding that an Act 
authorizing federal grants to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies for 
services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy 
does not violate the Establishment Clause).  I would maintain that the Court’s requirement of 
written proof of tax misconduct by a religiously affiliated organization is overly deferential, 
which is another point to be explored in American Atheists’ suit against the I.R.S.  I also 
would maintain that the dissenters were correct in the fractured opinion of Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a federally funded program providing 
supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid 
under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian 
schools by government employees under a program containing safeguards such as those 
present in New York City's Title I program). 
 212. See also Robert A. Destro, Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J. L. & 
RELIGION 355, 369 (1995) (“The significance of the Test Clause is thus both structural and 
normative.”). 
 213. Brian K. Gran & Laurel Gaddie, Changing Boundaries: Child Abuse, Public 
Health, and Separation of Church and State, 21 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2003). 
 214. Id. at 30. 
 215. See Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 
(2001) (determining whether private entity has taken on the role of a state actor); Lebron v. 
Nat’l Rail. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (determining whether a private entity has 
taken on the role of a state actor). 
 216. Gran & Gaddie, supra note 203, at 30. 
 217. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Vol. I-II. (J.F. & C. 
Rivington, et. al., eds., 6th ed. 1785); see also HENRY HITCHINGS, DR JOHNSON'S 
DICTIONARY: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE BOOK THAT DEFINED THE WORLD  225 
(2005) (noting the importance of Samuel Johnson’s A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, and stating, “The American adoption of the Dictionary was a momentous event 
not just in its history, but in the history of lexicography.  For Americans in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, Johnson was the seminal authority on language, and the subsequent 
development of American lexicography was coloured by his fame”).  The dictionary defines 
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This novel theory offers potential for nonbelievers and others seeking 
new means to challenge differing treatment of believers and nonbelievers in 
certain contexts.218  Although it remains to be seen how courts will respond 
to these novel challenges by atheists, existing Establishment Clause 
principles seem to be transforming into an increasingly ineffective 
mechanism for attacking government-sponsored religious expression.  As a 
result, nonbelievers are charged with the task of pursuing new legal theories 
– like the Sixth Amendment’s Religious Test Clauses – to achieve balance 
and fairness in religious messaging. 
IV.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, significant Supreme Court Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence supports the conclusion that ostracism of nonbelievers in 
parts of the nation, strongly and politically influenced by religious 
fundamentalism, is, in fact, an unconstitutional violation of their rights as 
American citizens.  While there is risk in pushing for the Supreme Court to 
solidify the promises within that jurisprudence, there is daily harm and risk 
for the future if the Court does not remedy the second-class citizen status of 
many American nonbelievers.  This Article is proffered in the hope that 
those seeking to litigate such issues may contribute to the development of 
novel theories so as to minimize the risk to the most progressive aspects of 
                                                                                                     
“Pu’blick. adj. [public, publique, Fr. Publicus, Latin.]” as: 
1. “Belonging to the state or nation; not private. Open; notorious; generally 
known”; 2. “General; done by many Regarding not private interest, but the good 
of the community”; and 3. “Open for general entertainment.”   
The Dictionary defines “trust” as:   
1. “Confidence; reliance on another”; 2. “Charge received in confidence”; 3. 
“Confident opinion of any event”; 4. “Credit given without examination”; 5. 
“Credit on the promise of payment”; 6. “Something committed to one’s faith”; 
7. “Deposit something committed to charge of which an account must be 
given:”; 8. “Confidence in supposed honesty”; and 9. “State of him to whom 
something is entrusted.” 
 218. Of course, it is possible that the course of the litigation will come to emphasize the 
more traditional Establishment Clause arguments.  American Atheists also claims that the 
I.R.C. 501(c)(3) violates the Establishment Clause.  It likely will need to distinguish Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n. of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that a New York statute 
exempting from real property tax realty owned by association organized exclusively for 
religious purposes and used exclusively for carrying out such purposes is not 
unconstitutional as an attempt to establish, sponsor or support religion or as an interference 
with free exercise of religion), to successfully challenge differing treatment for believers and 
non-believers. 
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the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence in light of what some 
people fear are the leanings of the conservative core of the Roberts Court. 
